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ABSTRACT
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE APPROACHES FOR ENERGY
OPTIMIZATION IN MICROGRIDS
TAMAL ROY
2020
The future electrical system termed as smart grid represents a significant paradigm
shift for power industry. Nowadays, microgrids are becoming smarter with the integration
of renewable energy resources (RESs) , diesel generators , energy storage systems (ESS),
and plug-in electric vehicles (PEV or EV) . However, these integration bring with new
challenges for intelligent management systems. The classical power generation
approaches can no longer be applied to a microgrid with unpredictable renewable energy
resources. To relive these problem, a proper power system optimization and a suitable
coordination strategy are needed to balance the supply and demand. This thesis presents
three projects to study the optimization and control for smart community and to investigate
the strategic impact and the energy trading techniques for interconnected microgrids.
The first goal of this thesis is to propose a new game-theoretic framework to study
the optimization and decision making of multi-players in the distributed power system.
The proposed game theoretic special concept-rational reaction set (RRS) is capable to
model the game of the distributed energy providers and the large residential consumers.
Meanwhile, the residential consumers are able to participate in the retail electricity market
to control the market price. Case studies are conducted to validate the system framework
using the proposed game theoretic method. The simulation results show the effectiveness
xiv
and the accuracy of the proposed strategic framework for obtaining the optimum profits
for players participating in this market. The second goal of the thesis is to study a
distributed convex optimization framework for energy trading of interconnected
microgrids to improve the reliability of system operation. In this work, a distributed
energy trading approach for interconnected operation of islanded microgrids is studied.
Specifically, the system includes several islanded microgrids that can trade energy in a
given topology. A distributed iterative deep cut ellipsoid (DCE) algorithm is implemented
with limited information exchange. This approach will address the scalability issue and
also secure local information on cost functions. During the iterative process, the
information exchange among interconnected microgrids is restricted to electricity prices
and expected trading energy. Numerical results are presented in terms of the convergent
rate of the algorithm for different topologies, and the performance of the DCE algorithm is
compared with sub-gradient algorithm. The third goal of this thesis is to use proper
optimization approaches to motivate the household consumers to either shift their loads
from peaking periods or reduce their consumption. Genetic algorithm (GA) and dynamic
programming (DP) based smart appliance scheduling schemes and time-of-use pricing are
investigated for comparative studies with demand response.
1
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The generation of electricity is very essential to meet the consumer load demand. A
dependable and consistent supply is necessary to facilitate economic and industrial growth
and to advance the quality of life. The demand of electricity has been increasing day by
day and is expected to double in value between 2000 and 2030 [1]. By considering the
today’s consumer view and environmental changes, it is important for the utility company
to decrease the electricity buying cost of the consumers and to connect the distributed
energy resources (DERs) such as renewable energy sources (RESs) with the traditional
energy generation. The increasing load demand is overloading the traditional power grids
and conventional solution strategies are facing the complexity of exiting networks [2]. The
solution of these critical issues of the traditional power plant is the implementation of
some new power grids. The new power grids use RESs instead of fossil fuels to eliminate
the greenhouse gas emission. Additionally, the technologically developed new type of
power grids are able to adjust the real time power generation based on demand of users.
Smart grid is one of the technologically advanced power grid that uses two way
communication to gather information of the users so as to improve the efficiency
reliability, economics and stainability of the production and distribution of electricity
[3]–[7]. The SG can adjust power generation or electricity consumption by using the
smart meter installed in houses or buildings of the consumers so as to increase the energy
efficiency and power system stability[8]–[10].
A smart micro-grid (MG) is a small scale grid that use distributed energy storage
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Figure 1.1. A general schematic diagram of smart grid with possible solutions.
and the integration of renewable energy (RE) resources to generate electricity [11]–[13].
The micro-grid can operate as standalone or islanded mode or in conjunction with main
utility grid [14]–[16]. The micro-grid is intergraded near the end users. Therefore, the
electricity buying cost of the consumer from the micro-grid is less than buying cost from
the power whole seller (i.e., macro-station). The micro-grid can easily adjust the
electricity generation. It can produce power based on the power demand of the consumers.
Additionally, the micro-grid can be deployed or removed easily according to the load
demand of the users.
Motivated by the above advantages of smart micro-grid, several researches all over
the world have been conducted [17]–[21]. Although it will increase the green energy,
these resources cannot ensure the stability and reliability of power production. The
intermittent nature of renewable energy are introducing more uncertainties on the power
system. For instance, the photovoltaic (PV) panel can not work at night and the wind farm
can generate different power on different time. Also, the power consumption of
3
consumers are different in different time of a whole day. The peak demand period is
considered the heaviest power consumption time while the remaining time is defined to as
the off-peak. Furthermore, the peak time differs in different seasons. For instance, during
summer, the peak time is usually observed in noon/ afternoon. On the other hand, during
winter, spring and autumn, the afternoon defines as off-peak time.
Nowadays, due to the increasing level of the competition in the energy market, game
theory has been recognized as one of the practically appealing solution approach to find
the market equilibrium [22]–[24]. In the deregulated market, the providers and consumers
are the active participants. Technological development of the power system leads to a
significant increase in the number of active players in the market. These active market
participants lead the market towards cost reduction and maximizing the profits of the
players, increasing market reliability. Active market participants commence a bid by using
and computing real market clearing price. Smart grid technologies have a great impact on
the strategic decisions of consumers’ behavior. The traditional electricity market has faced
complex problems such as unbalanced information, strategic interference and the
possibility of multi-phase equilibrium [25]–[27]. Smart competitive structures such as
retail market structure based on electricity market agents are an alluring item for
simulating such problems. Each market player is an autonomous agent with independent
pricing strategies that can behave to match the outcome of the electricity market. In the
classical electricity market, when the number of generators is higher than the number of
sellers, that makes the market less efficient. In the recent electricity market, electricity
buyers are no longer price takers since they are can influence the market by using different
bidding strategies, as well as cooperating with other buyers. Therefore, in recent years, it
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brings more attention to find a proper game theoretic approach to develop and investigate
the multi-player decision making strategies in the retail electricity market with high
penetration of renewable energy resources in the field of power system optimization.
In traditional power system, energy is generated by large generation plants in
centralized fashion. In centralized system, the energy needs to be transported over long
distance and through complex transportation meshes to the end users. Such complicated,
inflexible structure can certainly create burden to the whole power system and make
outages. The immense implications are responsible for recent grid failures in North
America that have caused monetary losses and people discomfort [28]. The technological
developed smart grid aims to develop traditional power grid by introducing the
interconnected micro-grids system in distributed way. The distributed microgrid system
allows the energy exchange with several micro-grids which are islanded from the utility
grid. By using IMS, it is easy to ensure the full utilization of local energy resources,
reduce the energy operation cost and achieve reliability of power delivery [29]–[31]. From
the aspect of Energy trading game, the MGs can act as players from cooperative
perspective. The MGs can be described as prosumers with both attributes of buyers and
sellers. During different time periods, MGs can act as seller and buyer based on their
respective load demand and aim at maximizing their individual benefits. Therefore, the
distributed energy trading is necessary to accomplish the global operation goal of
interconnected micro-grid system which preserves scalability and privacy issues.
Recently, the peak power consumption in household has caused adverse effects to
the stability and reliability of the conventional electricity system [32]. Reducing the peak
power consumption can reduce the instability of the power system [33]. The concept of
5
demand side management strategy can encourage the consumers to reduce the cost of
electricity by reducing the peak demand by shifting the load from peak hour to off-peak
hours [34]–[38]. In the United States, many demand response strategy are largely
implemented by industrial and commercial consumers . These strategies are mainly direct
load control, real-time pricing and time-of-use [39]. On the contrary, very few DR
programs have been used for residential consumers. The traditional large scale based
demand management program is applicable for industrial and commercial sector, it is not
suitable for residential consumers to manage large number of residential houses without
communication and automation [40]. The smart grid equipped with micro-grids can
enable efficient and reliable bidirectional communication between utility operator and the
end users. So, the intelligent energy management algorithm need to be investigated to
balance the supply and demand.
1.2 Literature Review on Game Theoretic Approach for Distributed Electricity Providers
in Deregulated Power Market
In the past several years, the majority of research of multi-player energy trading
competition has been conducted on the supply side [36], [41]–[46] while demand side has
not been concentrated. In this market structure, the participants of both sides of supply
and consumption continuously adapt their strategies according to their objective function.
In [47], the authors concentrated on controlling the locational marginal price (LMP) of
buyers and by using different algorithms and strategic decisions based on game theory. In
the proposed market structure, the market participants of both the supply and consumption
sides conform their strategies according to their objective function. Moreover, power
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market researchers have concentrated on dividing the market players inside coalitions
such that the collaborative players’ payoff becomes maximum [47]. The future
distribution system, with high participation of renewable energy that has various
non-convex objective functions including generation, storage device, and controllable load
has been studied in past works of literature [48]–[51]. In [52], authors proposed a
non-cooperative game to develop a trade mechanism through electricity trading at an
electric vehicle to improve a decentralized market. However, existing works have been
mainly focused on the control and operation problem of individual energy district (ED)
with special attention to frequency stability and reliability improvement based on
producers and prosumers is still considered as an promising area of research. In the retail
electricity market which is inspired by the ”Energy Internet” concept, consumption player
play an active role in managing their load demands. This market allows to analyze
consumers’ reaction to price fluctuations. This is particularly essential in the demand side
management, where consumer should change their demand through financial incentives.
In the last decade, the urgent need for a more efficient and reliable electricity
market, which was triggered by environmental concern and estimations of high
penetration of Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) into the market, has necessitated an
intelligent construct within the electricity market. The future electricity markets is highly
dependent on renewable energies. Renewable energy integration, coupled with volatile
electricity prices,signify the importance of energy management in smart grids. The high
penetration of distributed production agents in the residential sector eliminates the
concerns regarding high load demand and sustainability issues. These production agents
supply their own electricity demand and sell the rest to consumption agents, who can
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manage their load demand in response to the spot market prices.
Therefore,to find market equilibrium, a state where all active market participants
have made the most optimal decision is an objective for market participants [53]. The
market equilibrium empowers all players to make an optimal decision, based on their
competitors’ choice. The multiple number of production agents and consumption agents
in the retail market facilitate a game theoretic approach to find the market clearing prices.
1.3 Literature Review on Distributed Energy Trading for interconnected Micro-grids
Recent studies focus on the energy optimization strategy of IMS and proposed
method can be divided into two types: centralized optimization and distributed
optimization. Normally, if all the MGs share information on their respective load,
generation and grid condition, the system could be easily implemented based on classical
optimization such as optimal power flow (OPF) . For instance, in [54] the authors consider
a method of joint and distributed control of IMS. Alternatively, a method of Newton-like
descend is proposed in this work [55] to solve the three-phase optimal power flow
problems. For the security facts, these centralized solution may undergo from privacy
issues [55], [56] which encouraged the authors [57], [58] to deploy distributed optimal
power flow in the power system and most recently in [59]–[61]. However, the OPF
problem is non-convex and the solution is too complicated to compute. In this work,
conversely to the existing works, we will focus on trading mechanism of interconnected
micro-grids rather than electrical operation of the utility grid. In the context of energy
trading, distributed energy resources can make the current oligopolistic market to a
flexible one [62]. For instance, the authors in [63] proposed a game theoretic approach to
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trade the stored energy with other elements of the grid. In terms of demand response, the
authors in [64] studied a generalized Nash equilibrium problem considering demand
response where aggregators and micro-grids are formulated as non-cooperative game.
However, majority of existing works [65]–[67] focus on energy trading mechanism based
on architectural framework. [68], [69]
1.4 Literature Review on Optimization in Load Scheduling of a Residential Community
Using Dynamic Pricing
Majority of studies investigated domestic energy management from theoretic
perspective [70]–[77]. In [70], day-ahead scheduling and real-time regulation were
connected to solve the uncertainties of the electricity price and hot water usage. In [71],
the Monte Carlo simulation was enforced to solve RTP-based home energy management,
and association with financial risks, modeled by the conditional value-at-risk. In [72], the
scheduling of the household power consumption was taken as a Markov decision process,
which directed to find decision thresholds for both controllable and uncontrollable
appliances only with current prices and statistic knowledge about future prices. In [73],
the uncertainty of the RTP was done through the robust optimization approach, which
assumed that the unknown prices within the scheduling boundary had minimum and
maximum limits. In [74], the day-ahead scheduling for the air conditioning (AC) was
investigated in association to the uncertainties within the day-ahead electricity price and
outdoor temperature forecasting, which were formed by fuzzy sets. In [75], the Lyapunov
optimization approach was employed to reduce the long-term desired electricity cost for
the household energy consumption, which comprised with renewable energy, controllable
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loads, and uncontrollable loads. In [76], the demand response (DR) control strategy is
proposed to control the total power consumption under the specified power limit during
DR period. Appliances load demands are met according to priority of the load. In [77], a
single objective optimization problem is performed to minimize the power consumption as
well as the electricity cost. In this work, two optimization algorithms are compared with
four appliances using external solver CPLEX.
In [78], optimization has been done for single house using particle swarm
optimization to schedule the loads according to the priority placed by the customer. The
authors estimate the schedule for hourly charging or discharging of the battery of electric
vehicle, hours for turning on the heater for heating and hourly power of the pool pump and
the water heater. In [73], the authors presented an optimization algorithm that ensures a
residential consumer to adjust his or her cumulative hourly load level by varying hourly
electricity prices. In [79], the authors proposed a multi-objective optimization model
based on dynamic pricing, controllable load and a heuristic for household microgrids. The
authors develop an evolution algorithm using hybrid differential coding to optimize the
residential appliances and resource management. In paper [80], the authors proposed a
hierarchical control scheme for distribution grids using the principles of organic
computing to evaluate the results of simulations that handle variable tariffs and building
energy management systems to facilitate demand response. However, the cost
minimization considering different tariffs schemes, comfort of users, priority of loads of
multiple houses have not been well-documented in the literature.
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1.5 Motivations and Contributions
Motivated by the existing literature, we develop a game theoretic approach based on
[48] to engage distributed electricity users and control the market price through load
management. The objective is to maximize the production agents profit and minimize the
consumption agents cost at Nash equilibrium point. Compared to prior works (e.g., [48],
[49], [50], [52]), the main contributions of this work are:(i) A game theoretic approach is
proposed based on ( [48], [49], [50]) to analyze the behavior of production agents and
consumption agents in the proposed market structure. Different from other prior works,
the proposed model considers the control operation of market price through load
management. The retail market electricity price is cleared at Nash equilibrium point. And
(ii) the rational reaction sets (RRS) are used to model the game between production agents
and consumption agents, and the economic operations of distributed electricity consumers
are investigated of the future residential distributed system.
Motivated by aforementioned works, we have studied the energy trading mechanism
between the islanded MGs without the need of a central coordinator. Each MGs buy/sell
energy from/to adjacent MGs without sharing the local cost information. The objective of
this work is to minimize the global operation cost (generation plus transmission costs) by
preserving the local information. Compared with the previous works (e.g., [68], [69],
[81]), the main contribution of this work include: (i) A distributed iterative algorithm
based on deep cut ellipsoid method is proposed for energy trading between isolated MGs.
Different from prior works, this work analyzes the comparative study between two
distributed energy trading approaches using different topologies (Full, Line, Ring, Star).
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(ii) the performance of two distributed algorithms are validated with different case studies.
In recent years, literature exhibits the cost minimization considering different tariff
schemes, comfort of users, priority of loads of a single house. In this paper, considering
the insufficient information of existing literature on community based energy management
system, an optimization model is developed for a community. Genetic algorithm (GA) and
dynamic programming (DP) are used as the optimization schemes to solve the load
scheduling problems. The impact of priority of using residential appliances is also
considered. The main objective is to comparative study of three optimization approaches
as genetic algorithm (GA), aggressive dynamic programming (DPmax), conservative
dynamic programming (DPmin) in terms of cost minimization of the utility. The DPmax
(aggressive) and DPmin (conservative) are designed in terms of comfort of user and energy
cost saving, respectively. Contribution of this work include: (a) A small community
energy management system is developed with three houses considering the comfort level;
(b) three types of houses with real-world appliances are implemented for a small
community according to physical characteristics; (c) the three control approaches is
evaluated on three case studies (fixed priority, with priority and without priority). The
fixed priority is defined that the appliances will optimize the system according to their
fixed priority order. With priority is specified that one appliance will work all the time and
other appliances will be scheduled based on optimization approaches. For without
priority, no priority order of using the appliances is set up for optimizing the energy
consumption. d) The robustness of three different control approaches is validated for a
residential community load scheduling problem.
12
1.6 The Structure of Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses a game-theoretic
optimization scheme to analyze the behavior of power production agents and consumption
agents as well as to find the market clearing price at Nash equilibrium. A distributed
iterative algorithm based on deep cut ellipsoid method for multiple micro-grids is
demonstrated in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the power system optimization in a residential
community for multiple houses considering comfort of users is discussed. A detailed
description of the appliances model and performance comparison of the two optimization
approaches are provided.The algorithm is discussed and applied to various topologies.
Finally, conclusions of the thesis and possible future works are presented in Chapter 5.
Computational Intelligence Approaches For Energy Optimization 
In Microgrids
Energy Optimization of a 
Residential Community
Project #2
Distributed Convex Energy 
Exchange Frameworks for 
Interconnected Microgrids
Project #3
Energy Optimization 
Approaches of a Residential 
Community Using Dynamic 
Pricing
Project #1 
Game Theoretic Energy 
Optimization Approach of 
Power Generation and 
Consumption Agents
Energy Management 
Approaches for Microgrids 
Genetic 
Algorithm
Deep Cut Ellipsoid 
Algorithm
Dynamic 
Programming
Factorial design method 
using Rational Reaction Set
Sub-Gradient 
Algorithm
Figure 1.2. The structure of thesis.
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CHAPTER 2 GAME THEORETIC ENERGY OPTIMIZATION APPROACH OF
POWER GENERATION AND CONSUMPTION AGENTS
2.1 Introduction
Recently, electricity market has changed largely due to environmental and economic
situations. In the deregulated market, the providers and consumers are the active
participants. Technological development of the power system leads to a significant
increase in the number of active players in the market. These active market participants
lead the market towards cost reduction and maximizing the profits of the players,
increasing market reliability [82]-[83]. Active market participants commence a bid by
using and computing real market clearing price.
Smart grid technologies have a great impact on the strategic decisions of consumers’
behavior. The traditional electricity market has faced complex problems such as
unbalanced information, strategic interference and the possibility of multi-phase
equilibrium [25]–[27]. Smart competitive structures such as retail market structure based
on electricity market agents are an alluring item for simulating such problems. Each
market player is an autonomous agent with independent pricing strategies that can behave
to match the outcome of the electricity market. In the classical electricity market, when
the number of generators is higher than the number of sellers, that makes the market less
efficient. In the past several years, the majority of research has been on the supply side. In
[84]-[85], the market players are played individually and cooperatively, and their
cooperation resulted in a great profit, although the free-rider issue may also have
appeared. In the comprehensive market, electricity purchasers are no longer price takers,
14
since they can leverage the market by introducing different bidding strategies as well as
cooperating with other purchasers. Hence, it is important to investigate and advance the
individual and cooperative strategies of electricity purchasers. In this chapter, the control
operation of electricity market price through load management is investigated on the retail
electricity market which allows high integration of small renewable production agents in a
competitive manner instead of market price set by regulations. Compared to prior works
(e.g.,[48],[49],[52]), the main contributions of this work are:
• A energy optimization problem for retail electricity market is formulated for each
distributed production agent, where the wind energy, the solar energy, the energy
storage (ES), and the diesel generator models are taken into consideration. A proper
game theoretic approach is proposed to analyze the behavior of production agents
and consumption agents in the proposed market structure. Different from other prior
works, the proposed model considers the control operation of market price through
load management. The retail market electricity price is cleared at Nash equilibrium
point.
• The rational reaction sets (RRS) are used to model the game between production
agents and consumption agents, and the economic operations of distributed
electricity consumers are investigated of the future residential distributed system.
2.2 Proposed Model Description
The proposed benchmark for electricity market is represented based on [48] in
Figure 4.1. In this proposed energy market, small production agents which are equipped
with various generation and storage units, like photovoltaic systems, wind turbine, diesel
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generators and distributed energy storage devices. The DER’s agents can communicate
and share information with each other. This communication results in maximizing profits
and improves market stability and reliability. The smart grid enable bidirectional
communication for the consumers to easily access the grid and the production agents and
collects information regarding storage units, generating units and loads [86]. In the
proposed framework, the small production agents are autonomous entities than traditional
suppliers. This market structure facilitates large integration of renewable resources, which
is important to ensure more sustainable future electricity market.
Production 
agent 1
Production 
agent 2 Community 1 Community 2
Clearing Control Center
Operational View
Clear the market price
Provide guidance to the price
Utility Grid
                
Non-cooperative game Cooperative game 
Non-cooperative game 
Figure 2.1. Proposed smart grid hierarchy model including DER’s production agents, mul-
tiple communities, utility grid and bi-directional communications [48]
The developed retail market model enables the active participation of the household
consumers with exploitation and management of distributed energy resources (DER). The
small production agents can cooperate each other to obtain more profit. On the other hand,
customers are participating in the market by managing their shift-able load demand to
reduce final electricity price. The consumers are regularly involved in setting the market
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prices. In this work, DER’s production agents have no control in setting the market price.
The role of the grid is different than in conventional electricity market model. In such
retail electricity market, the utility grid no longer occupies power plant. The utility grid is
considered an independent unit to meet the shortage of power from small production
agents. It also provides ancillary services to the consumption agents and small DER’s
production agents. In this work, the utility grid is not considered as the active player in the
game model. The game exists among a large number of production agents and
consumption agents.
2.3 Objective Functions and Constraints
This section represents the mathematical formulation of the key concept of the
highly competitive retail electricity market. This proposed framework allows a high
penetration of distributed generators (DG) and energy storage. The participants of the
market can be categorized into three groups: small production agents, consumption
agents, and the utility grid. But, the utility grid has not participated in the market.
2.3.1 Objective functions
For the ith (e.g.i=1,2) production agent, the objective function can be defined as the
summation of differences between revenue and cost over 24 hours in the one-hour
interval. The profit function of production agent 1:
P1 =
t=24
∑
t=1
= (R1,t−C1,t). (2.1)
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The profit function of production agent 2:
P2 =
t=24
∑
t=1
= (R2,t−C2,t). (2.2)
The production agents objective function:
arg maxJproductionagents = P1×P2 (2.3)
where R1,t ,C1,t and R2,t ,C2,t are the revenue function of tth hour of production agents 1
and 2 respectively.
The retail electricity price is a function of aggregated load demand. This price
function is considered to be identical for all the players following a singular distribution
system [87].
λ (Pdtotal) = (−α×Pdtotal)+β ,α ≥ 0 (2.4)
where λ is the electricity price in $/kWh, Pdtotal is the total load demand and α and β are
the load demand coefficients.
The revenue function of every single production agent at tth hour can be expressed
as:
Ri,t = λ (Pdtotal)× [Pwind,i(t)+Psolar,i(t)+PDG,i(t)+PES,i(t)] (2.5)
where Pwind,i is the output power of the ith supplier, Psolar,i is the solar output power
of the ith production agent, PDG,i is the diesel generator output power of the ith production
agent and PES,i is the battery output power of the ith production agent.PES,i can be positive
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and negative based on discharging and charging mode respectively. The cost function of
ith production agent at tth hour can be defined as:
Ci,t = [ψwindPwind(i, t)+ψsolarPsolar(i, t)+ψDGPDG(i, t)+ψESPES(i, t)], (2.6)
where ψ is production cost of energy generation units. Wind and solar power
generators are considered as non-manageable units, and their power output depends on
uncertain and variable energy resources. In this work, the production cost of renewable
energy resources (i.e, wind and solar) is assumed to be negligible in long term such that
ψsolar = 0 and ψwind = 0. The degradation cost of the storage device is beyond the scope of
this paper. so, the cost of energy storage units, ψES = 0. Since the small-scale DGs have
negligible startup and shutdown time, the startup and shutdown cost is assumed as a
constant for each DG units. The cost of DG unit (ψDG) can be formulated a strictly
convex quadratic function as:
Ci,t = ψDG = aiP2DG(t)+biPDG(t)+ ci. (2.7)
For the residential community, the objective function is to minimize the operating cost by
managing their own displaceable loads. For ith community at tth hour, the objective
function is defined as:
arg minJcommunity =
t=24
∑
t=1
λ (Ptotal)×Pdi,t (2.8)
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2.3.2 Local and global constraints
Each player can make decisions on their own subject to local as well as global
constraints.
The local constraints include the following relation:
2.3.2.1 Local regulation of wind generation
The wind output power can be determined from power function based on wind
speed according to following relation:
Pwind(i, t) =

0 v < vci or v > vco
Pr(v−vci)
(vr−vci) vci ≤ v≤ vr
Pr vr ≤ v≤ vco
The wind turbine need to maintain the power output (Pwind(i, t)) within the specified range
[Pwind,i,min,Pwind,i,max] for the ith player at tth hour.
Pwind,i,min ≤ Pwind(i, t)≤ Pwind,i,max (2.9)
where Pwind(i, t) is the power output and Pwind,i,min and Pwind,i,max are the minimum
and maximum power output of wind energy resources for the ith player at tth hour.
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2.3.2.2 Local regulation of solar generation
Solar energy system power distribution can be calculated using solar Irradiation.
The solar energy system output power is determined as follows:
Psolar(i, t) = Ac×η× It (2.10)
The power generation (Psolar(i, t)) of solar panel should control within the specified range
[Psolar,i,min,Psolar,i,max] for the ith player at tth hour.
Psolar,i,min ≤ Psolar(i, t)≤ Psolar,i,max (2.11)
where Psolar(i, t) is the power generation and Psolar,i,min and Psolar,i,max are the minimum
and maximum power output of solar energy system for the ith player at tth hour.
2.3.2.3 Diesel generator technical limits
The DG of ith player at any given tth hour must operates with the expected power
output within the specified boundary [PDG,i,min,PDG,i,max].
PDG,i,min ≤ PDG(i, t)≤ PDG,i,max (2.12)
where PDG,i,min and PDG,i,max are the minimum and maximum output power of ith player
diesel generator. The high operating cost of diesel generator bound the suppliers to turn on
the generator at any given output. Especially, the expected power output must be greater
than minimum power output (PDG,i,min) of diesel generator.
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2.3.2.4 Energy storage technical limits
Every energy storage power output (PES(i, t)) must be satisfied within the specified
range [PES,i,maxd,PES,i,maxc] for the discharge and charging mode respectively, at tth hour
for the ith player.
PES,i,maxd ≤ PES(i, t)≤ PES,i,maxc (2.13)
where PES,i,maxd and PES,i,maxc are the maximum energy storage power in kW of discharge
and charge mode respectively. For restricting over-discharging and over-charging, the
state of charge of each battery must maintain safe range otherwise the energy storage unit
will switch to a standby mode.
The SOC in the energy storage at tth for ith player should remain within ceratin
range [SOCES,i,min,SOCES,i,max] to avoid damaging the energy storage lifespan.
The SOC at the next hour can be determined using the capacity of the energy
storage [Ecapacity,i] in the (∆t = 1 hr) interval and battery power output (PES(i, t)). PES(i, t)
might be negative or positive depending on charging and discharging modes respectively.
SOCES,i,min ≤ SOCES(i, t)≤ SOCES,i,max (2.14)
SOCES,i(t +1) = SOCES(i, t)−PES(i, t)×
∆t
Ecapacity,i
(2.15)
where SOCES,i,min and SOCES,i,max are the minimum and maximum state of charge
(SOC) of ES , Ecapacity,i is the battery capacity in kWh and ∆t is considered to be 1 hour.
PES(i, t) might be negative or positive depending on charging and discharging modes
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respectively. To ensure certain amount of electricity store in ES at the beginning of the
next day (24th hour), the minimum SOC at 24th hour is defined as:
SOCES,24 ≥ SOCES,end (2.16)
2.3.2.5 Upstream utility grid constraints
The considered market structure allows the production agents to buy and sell
electricity from the utility grid. Every player must satisfy the following relation when try
to sell electricity:
PGrid(i, t)≤ η× (Pwind(i, t)+Psolar(i, t)+PDG(i, t)+PES(i, t)) (2.17)
where PGrid(i, t) is the power sold to the utility grid by ith production agent at tth
hour. The negative PGrid(i, t) implies the selling electricity to the grid. On the other hand,
positive PGrid(i, t) indicates the buying electricity from the grid in extreme cases.
2.3.2.6 Residential community load constraints
The consumers of each residential community have the ability to control and
manage their responsive loads (RLD) at tth hour within the certain range.
ζ1PRL(i, t)≤ Pd(i, t)≤ ζ2PRL(i, t) (2.18)
where PBase(i, t) is the base load demand of the ith player at tth hour. ζ1 and ζ2 are the
minimum and maximum percentage of responsive load (RL) respectively.
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2.3.2.7 Global constraints of the system
According to the concept of conservation of energy, the power generated by
production agents must be equivalent to the consumptions agents.
∑
iεN
[Pwind(i, t)+Psolar(i, t)+PDG(i, t)+PES(i, t)+PGrid(i, t)] = ∑
jεN
Pd( j, t) (2.19)
where the left-hand side indicates the produced power in the market. PGrid(i, t) is the
buying or selling electricity from the grid. The total consumption by residential
community reflects on the right-hand side.
2.4 Proposed game theoretic solution
In the proposed electricity market model, all the players strategically interact with
each other by setting their power and load demand. Power production agents and
residential consumers choose strategies to achieve the maximum payoff. The power
production agents can maximize the profit by reducing the cost associated with power
generation. The consumers of the residential community can minimize the cost by
managing their load demand. The nature of the considered electricity market fit into the
n-person game. The production agents can communicate and share their knowledge with
each other to from a coalition. This collaboration can increase the market efficiency and
stability. This work considers non-cooperative game among the residential communities.
The game between production agents and residential communities can be iteratively
solved using special game-theoretic methodologies (e.g. Rational reaction set and Deign
of experiment- Response Surface method (DOE-RSM) ) to find the Nash equilibrium. The
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n-person game is defined by three components as N, Xi, ϕi, iεN . Each ith player belongs
to a set N= 1,2,3,....,n players. Xi is the strategy space of player ith player. The set of
collective strategies is defined as:
X = X1×X2×Xn (2.20)
where, ϕi is the ith player payoff function who calculates thew benefit by setting its
own strategy base on the strategy space of others. The term (yi|x) denotes the element
(x1, ......,xi−1,yi,xi+1, ....,xn). It states that the (x1, ......,xi−1,xi+1, ....,xn) player are
playing the game while the other ith player takes the action yi. The Nash equilibrium for
each ith player is defined as:
x∗= (x∗1, .....,x∗n) (2.21)
In other words, a Nash equilibrium solution is existed if x∗ is at least as good as for player
i as the action profile (xi,x∗−i); where every other player chooses x
∗
j while other player
chooses xi.
ϕi(x∗i |x∗)≥ ϕi(xi|x∗−i) (2.22)
This defines that if all players choose the equilibrium profile, no strategy profile
generates a preferable outcome for the ith player than the Nash equilibrium. The game
theoretic-rational reaction set is used to find Nash equilibrium of each player. In this work,
factorial design method in DOE is used to find the sensitivity of each generating units to
total load demand. Using the factorial design method, the rational reaction set of each
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residential community load demand by taking the consideration of other community load
demand.
2.4.1 Rational reaction set and Nash equilibrium
In the non-cooperative game, player 1 and player 2 are considered. The player 1 and
player 2 select strategies x and y where xεX and yεY . X and Y are the set of all possible
strategies each player can select. The objective function f1(x,y) and f2(x,y) represents the
cost function for player 1 and 2, respectively.
The Nash equilibrium exists where each player calculates its set of optimal solutions
based on the choices made by other players. This feasible set of solution for each player is
called rational reaction set (RRS) ([88],[48]). The RRS for player 1 and 2 can be
structured as:
f1(xN ,y) = min f1(x,y)→ xN(y) (2.23)
f2(x,yN) = min f2(x,y)→ yN(x) (2.24)
xN is the optimal solution of player 1 that varies depending on the strategy y chosen
by player 2. The function xN(y) is the RRS for player 1. Similarly, yN(x) is the RRS of
player 2. If, the intersection of these two sets exists, then that point would be the Nash
equilibrium solution for the non-cooperative game. Therefore, if the parametric equations
xN(y) and yN(x) are solved simultaneously, the resulting equilibrium solution is the Nash
equilibrium solution.
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2.4.2 Consumption agents game
The 30 levels of load demand value of residential community 1 and 2 are generated
which satisfy consumption agents’ load demand constraints. The residential community 1
solves its own problem for every level of other community load demand. Similarly, the
solution residential community 2 can be found. Then, each community load demand can
be modeled as through machine learning model (linear regression) as a linear equation:
Pd1,t = A×Pd2,t +B (2.25)
Pd2,t =C×Pd1,t +D (2.26)
where, Pd1,t and Pd2,t define the load demand of community 1 and community 2 at
tth hour respectively. A,B,C and D are the coefficients of linear equations. Finally, the
intersection of two linear equation sets of community 1 and 2 provides the Nash
equilibrium solution.
2.4.3 Production agents game
Due to the cooperative game, suppliers made a coalition. That’s why there is one
combined objective function of production agents. The factorial design method had also
applied here. The problem is solved for the production agents with each and every set of
data from consumption agents. The optimized values for Pwind(i), Psolar(i), PDG(i), PES(i),
PGrid(i) were gained for each set of consumption data. Then, a linear regression model can
be applied through the following formula:
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Pprod(n, t) = A×Ptotal +B (2.27)
where the above equation represents the RRS of the nth production agent as a
function of the total load demand at tth hour.
Finally, the optimal demand value (Ptotal) of residential communities at Nash
equilibrium were substituted into the production agents problem to find the Nash
equilibrium from the production agents.
Consumption agents solve the problem non-cooperatively 
and find the Nash equilibrium
Load demand information from consumption agents at 
Nash equilibrium
The production agents solve the optimization problem 
cooperatively at Nash equilibrium point
Initialize, , , ,        , ∈ ,
,   ≤ −    ≤
Iteration, n =1
For
time, t≤ −
For
iteration, n≤
Stopping criteria met ?
The optimum profit of the players at Nash equilibrium
t=t+1
n=n+1
Yes
NO
Figure 2.2. Proposed game theoretic algorithm flowchart
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2.5 Result and Discussion
The benchmark under study includes a collection of production resources (WT, PV,
DG, and ES) and consumers as the shift-able load. The system consists of 100 consumers.
That is equally divided into two community. The consumer’s load demand has been taken
from [89]. The cost coefficients (a,b and c) and (α,β ), are summarized in Table 3.1. The
σ1 = 20(%) and σ2 = 80(%) are minimum and maximum percentage of manageable
load demand respectively.
Table 2.1. Cost and Price coefficient
Coefficients α β a b c
Units $/kWh $/h $/kW 2h $/kWh $/h
Production agent 1 0.001 1.3 6×10−6 0.010 0
Production agent 2 0.001 1.3 7×10−6 0.015 0
For investigating the performance of the retail energy market (REM) based on
design of experiment-rational reaction set approach, three cases have been implemented in
the considered framework: case 1: Normal operating condition, case 2: Abundant
renewable energy resources (RES) and case 3: Shortage of renewable energy resources.
All the production agents have renewable energy resources and generator units that
summaries in Table 2.2.
2.5.1 Real time optimization
In the case of abundant renewable energy resources, the wind speed and solar
radiation are in good condition. Due to the large availability of renewable energy provides
the production agents higher profit than normal condition. Because the production cost of
renewable energy is assumed to be negligible. During the less available renewable energy
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Table 2.2. Production agents resources
Production agents Generation Type Quantity Capacity
Production agent 1
WT 30 kW 18 540 kW
PV 180 W 1840 350 kW
ES 24 V/84 Ah 631 1262 kW
DG 100 kW 7 700 kW
Production agent 2
WT 30 kW 8 240 kW
PV 180 W 1667 330 kW
ES 24 V/84 Ah 631 1262 kW
DG 260 kW 2 520 kW
hours, the production agents make a strategic decision not to turn on diesel generator
because of high operating cost at any given output and relies on utility grid to secure the
load demand. In other words, the expected power output of diesel generator should be
greater than the PDG,i,min. In those hours, the utility grid sells more electricity and the
production agents get less profit. In the case of shortage of RES, the solar radiation and
wind energy are in weak condition, the pursuit of maximizing the renewable energy
utilization can push the energy storage and diesel generator to operate all day. Also due to
the limitation of the capacity of energy storage and diesel generator, the shortage of
generated power can be given by utility grid. That’s why the profit is less than the normal
condition. Figure 4.2 shows the convergence of the payoff function values for the
production agents under different conditions. By iteratively solving the considered
problem, the payoff function values of production agents are gradually converging to an
equilibrium point in all scenarios. The payoff function values of production agents are
converged to a high value in case of abundant RES. On the other hand, the payoff function
values are converged to lower values because of buying electricity from the utility grid.
Therefore, the equilibrium payoffs of considered cases are found to be [2.06×106,
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2.74×106 and 1.46×106] respectively at 2nd hour and [2.25×106, 3.26×106 and
1.41×106] respectively at 10th hour.
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Figure 2.3. Pay-off function values of production agents at 2nd hour (left) and 10th hour
(right).
In case of the non-cooperative game, the residential communities solve their own
problem individually. Similarly, the production agents problem, both of the residential
communities pay-off functions are converged to a lower cost [Figure 4.14 and 4.15] for the
large availability of renewable energy hours. In the off-peak hours, the payoff function is
converged to the higher cost because of expensive electricity buying from the utility grid.
Using the equilibrium solution, the electricity market price can be cleared for the
future residential distribution system with multiple residential communities satisfying
local and global constraints. The clearing price of restructured electricity market can be
found at Nash equilibrium in Table 2.3.
2.5.2 Day ahead optimization
The day-ahead optimization is also completed in the proposed framework. Figure
4.16 and 2.7 show the convergence of the payoff function values for the players on the
31
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of iterations
0
50
100
150
200
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 1
 p
ay
-o
ff
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
 v
al
u
es
 (
$
)
2
nd
 hour 20
th
 hour
Figure 2.4. Pay-off function values of community 1
Table 2.3. Hourly electricity prices at Nash equilibrium
t Price ($/kWh) t Price ($/kWh) t Price ($/kWh)
1 0.9564 9 0.7513 17 0.5423
2 0.9641 10 0.9293 18 0.3369
3 0.9699 11 0.8530 19 0.1654
4 0.9446 12 0.8680 20 0.0889
5 0.9397 13 0.8845 21 0.1645
6 0.7831 14 0.9234 22 0.4099
7 0.7558 15 0.9243 23 0.4766
8 0.7695 16 0.7895 24 0.8519
production side and the consumption side with considered case studies. The payoff
function values iteratively achieved by production agents using the cooperative game.
While, consumption agents’ pay-offs can be obtained through non-cooperative game. The
payoff function values for all players gradually converged to an equilibrium point. The
equilibrium pay-offs for the consumption players are found to be [3352, 3456].
The optimum pay-offs at Nash equilibrium of the day ahead optimization of the
production agents for three considered cases are resulted to be [9.0422×105,
9.0830×105 and 8.8135×105].
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Figure 2.6. Pay-off function values of production agents
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, a game-theoretic method is proposed based on [48] to analyze the
behavior of the power generation and consumption players in the power system. The
proposed framework enables the distributed operators and residential consumers to
efficiently integrate a wide range of renewable energy resources. The residential
consumption agents play an important role in the market to control the electricity price.
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Figure 2.7. Pay-off function values of consumption agents
The consumption agents are not only able to find market clearing price at Nash
equilibrium point but also reduce the electricity cost individually (non-cooperatively).
Simulation case studies are conducted to validate the proposed game theoretic approach.
The proposed approach can be effectively used as a tool for investigating the retail
electricity market.
2.7 Acknowledgment
In this chapter, the work is developed and implemented based on the model of [48].
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CHAPTER 3 DISTRIBUTED CONVEX ENERGY EXCHANGE FRAMEWORKS
FOR INTERCONNECTED MICROGRIDS
3.1 Introduction
Distributed energy management with direct energy exchange among microgrids is
promising approach to improve the economy, reliability and efficiency of system
operation. In the interconnected microgrids system, each microgrid not only schedules its
local power supply and demand, but also trades energy with other microgrids.
Specifically, microgrids with excessive DERs generations can trade with other microgrids
which has deficit of power for mutual benefits. This cooperation of multiple microgrids
(MGs) can reduce the mismatch problem between distributed generation and demand,
improve the system performance, decrease the total cost of the power system. However,
existing strategies on microgrid energy trading only concentrate on simulation studies and
modeling issues.
This chapter tries to provide a extensive analytical solution for energy managemnt
problem among microgrids, can be implemented distributely without need of central
agent. More clearly, our distributed system model consists of N microgrids in which (a)
Each microgrids has own energy generation cost, (b) The distribution network operator
imposes the cost for transferring energy between adjacent microgrids, (c) each microgrid
owns power demand that must be fulfilled. Considering all of these issues, we have to find
the optimal amount of energy to be traded by the microgrids in order to minimize the total
operating cost of the considered system. In this work, a distributed iterative algorithm
based on dual decomposition is proposed that solve the problem distrbutely. For ensuring
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the safeguard, the information exchange among microgrids is limited to Lagrange
multiplier and expected buying energy. First, each microgrids individually enumerates the
amount of energy it should produce, sell and buy to minimize the local cost in terms of
current energy prices. Then, a energy prices are adjusted according to law of demand after
the energy bids netween microgrids. This two-step proceeds until global agreement is met
about prices and transferred energy. The performance of the proposed algorithm is
compared with existing approaches in [68] and [90] in terms of computational time and
iteration with different topologies.
3.2 System Model
A system composed of N = 4 interconnected MGs through a power interconnection
infrastructure and a communication network is considered which represents in Figure 3.1 .
MG-3
MG-1 MG-2
MG-4
Islanded Microgrids
Energy 
Exchange 
Network
Figure 3.1. A energy exchange network composed of multiple interconnected MGs, distri-
bution power line and communication network
During each scheduling time, E(g)i and E
(c)
i are the generation and consumption of
MG i respectively. Moreover, MG i is allowed to sell energy Ei, j to MG j, j 6= i, and to
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buy energy Ek,i from MG k, k 6= i. Then, The power balance within the MG requires
E(g)i + e
T
i A
T E(b)i = E
(c)
i + e
T
i AE
(s)
i (3.1)
where the two N-dimensional column vectors
E(b)i =

E1,i
.
.
.
EN,i

and
E(s)i =

E1,i
.
.
.
EN,i

In order to introduce the connection between MGs, an adjacency matrix A = [ai, j]N×N is
defined. If there exists a connection between MG i to MG j, element ai, j is set as 1 and
zero otherwise. Note that A mat be non-symmetric, meaning that at least two MGs are
allowed to share energy in one direction only. Moreover, we fix ai, j = 0, and if ai, j = 0→
Ei, j = 0 for all i, j = 1..., ..N.
The objective of this problem is to minimize the total operating cost of
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interconnected microgrid system, consisting of power generation and transmission cost.
So, the energy exchanged by interconnected MGs form the equilibrium point of the
following minimization problem:
minimize
Ei, j
N=4
∑
i=1
Ci(E
(g)
i )+∑
i=1
eTi A
T
β (E(b)i )
subject to Ei, j ≥ 0,∀i, j
E(c)i + e
T
i (AE
(s)
i −A
T E(b)i )≥ 0,∀i
(3.2)
where Ci(E
(g)
i ) is defined the cost of generating E
(g)
i units of energy at MG i;
β (E(b)i ) is the cost of transferring Ei, j units of energy between MG i and MG j; ei is the
ith column of the N×N identity matrix; E(b)i is the vector composed of the energy bought
from other MGs by MG i;
β (E(b)i ) = [β (E1,i).....β (EN,i)]
T (3.3)
The multiple MGs in one interconnected microgrid system, which have their set of
strategies, should be coordinated in order to achieve the global objective of the system and
meet power demands.
3.2.1 The cost functions
In the system model mentioned above, two cost functions have been introduced,
namely cost function Ci(E
(g)
i ) is the price MG i spend to generate the energy E
(g)
i , and the
cost function β (E(b)i ) is the cost of transferring energy between MG i to MG j. Both cost
functions are positive valued, monotonically increasing, convex and twice differentiable.
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The cost function Ci(Ei(g)) of a diesel generator (DG) is modeled as a quadratic
polynomial. So, the fuel cost is represented as follows:
Cdgi = ai +b(i)Pdgi + ciP
2
dgi (3.4)
where ai, bi and ci are the fuel cost coefficients of DG; and Pdgi is the output power of DG
i.
The total operation cost Ci(E
(g)
i ) includes the cost of all DG units of MG i,
Ci(E
(g)
i ) = ∑
N=4
N=1Cdgi.
For the transportation cost, many factors may have influence on the model, i.e, the
investment and construction cost of the network, etc. For simplicity, we imagine that the
cost of all connection topologies of the system is same. The transmission cost also is
quadratic; β (x) = px+qx+ rx2.
However, it is needed to comment on the cost functions, we need to describe how
they can be used to introduce a upper bound constraint on the energy generated by the
MGs or supported by the transfer connections. Indeed, one can design the cost function by
introducing so f t constraints with a sharp rise at nominal maximum value. The benefit of
doing this design is twofold: first, we can make flexible system by avoiding further
complexity to the minimization problem and the resulting constraint on the maximum
energy is so f t. By introducing soft upper bound, a MG of the system can generate more
energy than the nominal maximum power, but the MG needs to pay an (significant) extra
cost. This circumstance arises in the actual systems when backup generator activated.
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3.3 Distributed model and algorithm
3.3.1 Distributed optimal scheduling model
When considering the minimization problem (3.2), one can readily identify that the
objective function is strictly convex. Moreover, a centralized unit needs a control unit that
is aware of all system informations. This fact implies a considerable amount of data traffic
to gather all the information and can miss some annoying privacy issues. In this regard,
we propose a distributed iterative approach by decomposing the problem N local
subproblems, which can be implemented by the MGs in an autonomous and cooperative
manner.
By utilizing Lagrangian method and duality theorem, a multiplier strategy is
introduced as the exchanged information between MGs to solve the subproblem for each
MG. Thus, the distributed iterative solution (3.2) can be rewritten as:
C∗ = minimize
ε
(s)
i ,Ei, j
N=4
∑
i=1
Ci(E
(g)
i )+∑
i=1
eTi A
T
β (E(b)i )
subject to Ei, j ≥ 0,∀i, j
E(g)i + e
T
i A
T E(b)i = E
(c)
i + e
T
i AE
(s)
i ,∀i
ε
(s)
i = e
T
i AE
(s)
i ,∀i
(3.5)
The only difference with respect to (3.2) is the introduction of new variable ε(s)i to
represent the energy sold by MG i and later it will be equal to all the energy bought by
other MGs from MG i. The coupling constraint can be represented as ε(s)i = e
T
i AE
(s)
i .
Due to the convexity of primal dual problem (3.2), Lagrange multipliers are
introduced to relax the coupling constraints and solving the dual problem.
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C∗ = max
λ
C(λ ) (3.6)
where, C(λ ) = ∑Ni=1C
l
i (λ )
Cli (λ ) = min
ε
(s)
i ,E
(b)
i
Ci(ε
(s)
i ,E
(b)
i ,λ )
subject to Ei, j ≥ 0,εsi ≥ 0,∀ j
E(g)i + e
T
i A
T E(b)i = E
(c)
i + e
T
i AE
(s)
i
(3.7)
For each MG, we have:
Ci(ε
(s)
i ,E
(b)
i ,λ ) =Ci(E
g
i )+ e
T
i A
T
β (E(b)i )+ e
T
i A
T diagλE(b)i −λiε
(s)
i (3.8)
that is the contribution of MG i to the Lagrangian function relative to (3.2). The
parameter λ gathers all the Lagrange multipliers λi corresponding to coupling constraints
ε
(s)
i = e
T
i AE
(s)
i , respectively and for all i = 1, ....,N. Based on above analysis, each
Lagrange multiplier λi can be defined as the marginal cost of MG i, namely the selling
price of a unit of power to neighboring MGs. Thus, Lagrange function can be seen as net
expenditure. The net expenditure of each MG has four parts: (i) Ci(E
(g)
i ) is the generation
unit cost function; (ii) eTi A
T
β (E(b)i ) is the transmission network cost resulted from
transferring energy bought from other MGs; (iii) eTi A
T diagλE(b)i is the cost due to buying
energy; and (iv) λiε
(s)
i is the income by selling energy.
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3.3.2 Distributed algorithm
The problem can be transformed to maximum dual problem. To this end, the
optimal Lagrangian multiplier converge to the optimal point of dual problem (3.5),
λ ∗ = argmaxλC(λ ). More specifically, at each point λ [k], each MG minimizes its
corresponding contribution to the Lagrange function by solving the local subproblem (3.7)
and determining the minimum point (ε(s)i [k],E
(b)
i [k]) = (ε
(s)
i (λ [k]),E
(b)
i )(λ [k]).
In the previous work [68], the Sub−GradientAlgorithmis used to solve the
optimization problem. In this algorithm, the Lagrange multiplier are updated according to
λi[k+1] = λi[k]+α[k]

eT1 AE
(s)
1 [k]− ε
(s)
1 [k]
.
.
.
eTNAE
(s)
N [k]− ε
(s)
N [k]

(3.9)
where, α[k] is a positive step factor. However, the Sub-Gradient (SG) Algorithm needs the
initial assumption of price (λ ) and step size (α). Initial assumption is restrictive in the
Sub-Gradient Algorithm to find a optimal solution set. This initial assumption often
makes the algorithm slower. Moreover, without the initial assumption, Sub-Gradient
Algorithm fails to find a feasible solution. So, there is a need to find a faster algorithm to
improve the system performance.
The approach proposed in this work is based on the Deep Cut Ellipsoid (DCE)
Algorithm. According to [91], the DCE is used to determine the feasibility of a system of
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linear inequalities. The DCE Algorithm generates a ”decreasing” sequence of ellipsoids
that contain a minimizing point. The update of the dual variables may also be done in this
algorithm. The idea of choosing initial ellipsoid is to localize the set of candidate λ ’s
within a closed and bounded set. Therefore, This algorithm releases the users to initialize
the price values (λ ) at the first iteration and from choosing the step size (α).
The size and shape of the ellipsoid can be represented as λ and matrix P
respectively. The sub-gradient of C(λ ) in λ = λ [k] need to be computed from k− th can
be described as
ς [k] = [eTNAE
(s)
N [k]− ε
(s)
N [k]]N×1,∀λ (3.10)
Then we have, C(λ )≤C(λ [k])+ ςT (λ −λ [k]),∀λ , Then, the sub-gradient needs to be
normalized as,
(3.11)υ [k] =
ς [k]√
ςT × P[k]× ς [k]
First, The Lagrange multiplier (λ ) can be represented as,
(3.12)λi[k + 1] = λi[k] +
1 + N × α
N + 1
× P[k]× υ [k]
Second, the shape (matrix P) of the ellipsoid can be updated as:
P[k+1] =
N2
N2−1
× (1−α2)× (P[k]− 2(1+Nα)
(N +1)(1+α)
×P[k]×υ [k]× (υ [k])T ×P[k])
(3.13)
where, α is a positive step factor, P[k] is the shape of solution space; and k is the iteration
number.
Next, the updated Lagrange multiplier (λ ) will check the original bounds. If it is
within the bound, then it is converged else it will take next iteration according to (3.10),
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(3.11), (3.12), (3.13).
Algorithm 1 summarizes are the steps of the proposed distributed iterative
algorithm. For solving the (3.7), each MG should aware of ε(s)i [k] and E
(b)
i [K] , namely the
Algorithm 1 Distributed optimal scheduling algorithm
1: Initialize λmin, λmax, λi[0], P[0], M = 4, α = 0, k=0
2: At kth iteration
3: At any MG i
4: Compute the sub-gradient ς [k] = [eTNAE
(s)
N [k]− ε
(s)
N [k]]N×1,∀λ
5: Normalize the sub-gradient υ [k] = ς [k]√
ςT×P[k]×ς [k]
6: MGs exchange λi[k] with neighboring MG
7: MG i computes ε(s)i [k] and E
(b)
i [K] using (3.5) with λ [k].
8: MG i informs MG j( j 6= i) the energy it expects to buy namely E j,i[k], at the given
price λ j[k].
9: According to the expected purchasing energy E j,i[k] from other MGs, MG i obtains
10: E(s)i [k]⇒ [Ei1[k]........EiN [k]]T
11: MG i updates according to step 12 and 13
12: λi[k+1] = λi[k]+ 1+N×αN+1 ×P[k]×υ [k]
13: P[k+1] = N
2
N2−1 × (1−α
2)× (P[k]− 2(1+Nα)(N+1)(1+α) ×P[k]×υ [k]× (υ [k])
T ×P[k])
14: At any MG i
15: If λi < λmin
16: ς [k] =−1, υ [k] = ς [k]√
P[k]
,α = (λmin−λi)√
P[k]
17: Then, MG i updates according to step 18 and 19
18: λi[k+1] = λi[k]+ 1+N×αN+1 ×P[k]×υ [k]
19: P[k+1] = N
2
N2−1 × (1−α
2)× (P[k]− 2(1+Nα)(N+1)(1+α) ×P[k]×υ [k]× (υ [k])
T ×P[k])
20: k = k+1
21: Until stopping criteria is met.
total energy it sold and the vector composed of energy bought from other MGs. Moreover,
we can compute E(s)i from E
(b)
i . Combined with Algorithm 1, the Lagrangian multipliers
can be updated. Therefore, all necessary data can be computed by each MG without a
centralized controller. Also, the information traded between MGs is bounded to Lagrange
multipliers λi and the expected buying energy E j,i, which is interacted to the
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corresponding MG j . Hence, the privacy of MGs can be secured. According to Algorithm
1, each Lagrange multiplier λi can be interpreted as the price per energy unit requested by
MG i to sell energy to its neighboring MGs. Using the Lagrangian function (3.8), each
MG pays for generating energy, for purchasing energy and for transferring the energy it
purchases. On the other hand, the MG is paid for the energy it sells. By solving the
problem (3.7), MG is maximizing its profit for some given selling (λi[k]) and buying
(λ j, j 6= i) prices per unit energy. Based on the Algorithm 1, the price λi would be
modified constantly until the energy demand matches energy offer. As reported by (3.12),
if the energy offered by MG i is less than the requested energy from other MGs, the price
must be increased as the demand exceeds the supply. Conversely, when the demand by
MG i is less than the supply, the price will be decreased. However, the price does not
changed when the supply and demand are equilibrium.
3.3.3 Solution of The Local Subproblem
In this section, the solution of local subproblem is reported to support the global
minimization problem of the system. The minimization subproblem (3.7) at MG i behaves
according to six possible cases. Table (3.1) expresses these six different cases to support
the local subproblem as the intention of MG i to minimize local cost or equivalently, to
maximize net profits, when λis are interpreted as exchanging prices per energy unit. In the
first case, the MG i is generating all and only the energy it consumes, that is ε(s)i =0 and
E(g)i = E
(c)
i . So, the MG i is not interested to sell energy since the selling price is lower
than marginal generation cost. Indeed, the income will be lower than the extra production
cost. In addition, purchasing is not beneficial either since the purchasing price is higher
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Table 3.1. Possible Cases of Local Subproblem of MGi
Cases Generation Buy Sell
1 X − −
2 − X −
3 X X −
4 X − X
5 − X X
6 X X X
than the marginal production cost. Therefore, as for case 1, the MG i should remain self
constrained.
However, MG i is always willing to trade energy since their local cost
(Ci(E
(c)
i )+β (0)) is higher than the net payment. This case holds only in case 6. Similar
considerations hold for other cases.
3.4 Result and Discussion
Several case studies have been considered based on proposed energy trading
mechanism. A interconnected test system consisting of four different MGs, including DG
units only. The interconnection topology of interconnected microgrid system is
represented in Figure 1. The fuel coefficients of DG are a = 86.3852 $, b = 56.5640
$/MW and c =0.328412 $/(MW )2. The coefficients of transfer cost function are p = 0, q
= 0, r = 3.6828. The cable capacity assumes 100 MW. We have introduced a soft upper
bound Emax = 5MW as motivated by Section 3.2.1. The transfer cost function is set
without the upper bound.
3.4.1 Trading prices
Figure 3.2 represents the iterative process of electricity price of each MG. The
curves refer to a fully connected system, where microgrid loads are E(c) = [1,6,6,6] and
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each MG generation capacity is Pmax = 5MW . The result shows that the DCE algorithm
converges after 58 iterations. The prices of MG1, MG2, MG3 and MG4 are 59.3530
$/MWh, 67.3156 $/MWh, 67.3156 $/MWh and 67.3156 $/MWh, respectively. However,
the electricity prices of MGs converge to different values with same initial prices. Besides,
Figure 3.2 depicts the final selling prices of MGs which have direct relationship of their
own loads, that means, the MG that consumes more electricity has a higher selling price
after the convergence is achieved. For example, MG1 earns more money by selling energy
to the other MGs with a lower price, because it has lower power demand. In fact, the MG1
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Figure 3.2. Iterative process of the electricity price of each MG.
only generates and sells energy, whose local cost function is :
C1 =CDG1(PDG1)−λ1ε
(s)
1 (3.14)
The optimal λ1 = λ ∗1 can be give in the form of marginal cost:
λ
∗
1 =C
′
(PDG1) (3.15)
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On the other hand, the MG2, MG3 and MG4 only generate and buy energy from MG1.
They are all buying same amount of energy from MG1 and their local cost functions can
be represented as:
C2 =CDG2(PDG2)+β (E1,2)+λ2E1,2 (3.16)
C3 =CDG3(PDG3)+β (E1,3)+λ3E1,3 (3.17)
C4 =CDG4(PDG4)+β (E1,4)+λ4E1,4 (3.18)
Moreover, from the perspective of MG2, MG3 and MG4, λ ∗2 , λ
∗
3 and λ
∗
4 can be expressed
as:
λ
∗
2 =C
′
(PDG2)−β
′
(E1,2) (3.19)
λ
∗
3 =C
′
(PDG3)−β
′
(E1,3) (3.20)
λ
∗
4 =C
′
(PDG4)−β
′
(E1,4) (3.21)
Therefore, MG2, MG3 and MG4 should reduce its net expenditure by purchasing energy
from MG1. The price of MG1 after convergence can be calculated according to (3.15),
(3.19), (3.20) and (3.21), which is consistent with the result of Algorithm 1.
3.4.2 Trading energy
The iterative process of the energy trading between MGs is shown in Figure (3.3),
(3.4), (3.5) and (3.6). The energy trading after convergence at current time slot can be
explained as follows: MG2, MG3 and MG4 buy 1.07994 MWh energy from MG1
respectively. And the MG1 offer 3.25039 MWh energy to sell to other MGs. As we can
see, the total energy sold is eqal to total energy purchased in the system. The coupling
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constraints ε(s)i = e
T
i AE
(s)
i is fulfilled after convergence, which justifies that the algorithm
works well. During the optimization, the cost by power transmission between MGs is
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Figure 3.3. Iterative process of the trading energy of MG1.
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Figure 3.4. Iterative process of the trading energy of MG2.
covered by the electricity buyer. In the current time slot, MG2 buys energy from MG1 to
meet its load demand, as marginal cost of its own generating unit is higher than the sum of
selling price and the transmission cost of MG1.
Similarly, the marginal cost of MG3 and MG4 is not economical. So, it is beneficial
to work on lower generation limit.
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Figure 3.5. Iterative process of the trading energy of MG3.
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Figure 3.6. Iterative process of the trading energy of MG4.
3.4.3 Iterative process of variables
All optimal variables including the buying energy, selling energy, generation can be
solved by Algorithm 1. For instance, Figure (3.7) shows the iterative process of variables
of MG3. After convergence, MG3 buys 1.07995 MWh energy from MG1. The generation
of DG3 is 4.9184 MWh . According to power balance constraint, supplied power is equal
to net load demand. Moreover, supplied energy is 6 MWh, which is equal to the load
demand of MG3. Similarly, the supplied power can be satisfied in MG1, MG2 and MG4.
Having gained more insight into the iterative process, the decision of MG3 is affected by
the trading prices with MG2, MG4 and MG1. Initially, MG3 intends to buy a large
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Figure 3.7. Iterative process of the variables of MG3.
quantity of energy. However, selling prices of MG1 is increased with iterations, the
expected buying energy of MG3 has also been reduced, whereas the generation of DG is
increased. Finally, all the variables of MG3 converged to stable values. From this result,
we can find that each MG can decide to adjust generation of DG, or trade with other MGs
with a extensive consideration of the generation cost, trading price and load
characteristics, which ultimately reduces the total operation costs and makes power usages
flexible and interactive.
3.4.4 Benefits of interconnection
Given the same setting, each MG can also be operated autonomously. Table 3.2
represents the cost comparison of each MG between autonomous and interconnected
operation.
Table 3.2. Cost comparison of each MG between autonomous and interconnected operation
Microgrid ID
Cost ($)
MG1 MG2 MG3 MG4 Total
Autonomous operation 143.278 4610.83 4610.83 4610.83 13975.78
Interconnected operation 332.114 377.017 376.998 376.998 1463.11
The results show that energy trading not only deceases the global operation cost, but
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also decreases the the local expenditure of individual MG which has less generation.
Therefore, MG1 gains revenue by selling energy where as MG2, MG3 and MG4 reduce
their cost by purchasing energy.
3.4.5 Performance comparison with existing work
In order to interpret the benefits and advantages of the distributed model and deep
cut ellipsoid (DCE) algorithm, the results are compared with the existing work [68] in
terms of exchanged information, the number of MGs, solution algorithm and
performance. The results show that the DCE algorithm features advantages in several
aspects, especially in algorithm performance. The DCE algorithm has shown a better
convergence performance as compared with the algorithm proposed in [68].
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Figure 3.8. Iterative process comparison of price in MG3 between this work and that in
[68]
Finally, the optimal operation cost achieved by Algorithm 1 is almost equal to
centralized optimization, which is shown in (3.3).
As for the exchanged information, the centralized optimization requires all
measured data of sources and load to be transferred to the system central coordinator,
which results in more requirements on the overall communication cost. However, sharing
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Table 3.3. Comparison between centralized optimization and Distributed optimization
MG
Cost ($)
Centralized optimization Distributed optimization
MG 1 332.112 332.114
MG 2 377.08 377.017
MG 3 376.984 376.998
MG 4 376.971 376.988
Total 1463.147 1463.120
information of load and sources can lead to serious privacy and business issues, since
MGs may belong to different business owners. In this work, the DCE algorithm is
developed based on the distributed optimization framework of [68], the information
shared among MGs is limited to Lagrange multipliers and the expected buying energy
quantities, which are only communicated with trading MGs.
As for the convergence performance of algorithms, the simulation results show that
the DCE algorithm has an improved performance compared to the distributed sub-gradient
algorithm of [68]. In order to show the detail iterative process comparison of price in
MG3 between this work and [68] based on same test cases, as shown in Figure (3.8). The
DCE algorithm release the system to make restrictive assumption which makes the system
performance better. Because, the initial assumption makes the system slower. The deep
cut ellipsoid (DCE) algorithm has the faster iteration speed due to faster shrinking. First,
the initial assumption of price is made based on total cost function. Then , the price needs
to be maintained within the bounded limit which makes the solution space even smaller
that speeds up the system faster. Finally, the prices of MG3 in this work and [68] converge
to the same value. For energy exchange network, four different topologies (e.g. Full,
Ring, Line and Star) are considered as in Figure 3.9.
53
MG-1 MG-2
MG-3 MG-4 MG-4
MG-2MG-1
MG-3
MG-1 MG-2 MG-3 MG-4
(a) Fully connected (b) Ring
(c) Line   (d) Star
MG-1
MG-3MG-2
MG-4
Figure 3.9. Considered four topologies
The performance comparison for sub-gradient algorithm and DCE algorithm has
also been done for four topologies as in Figure 3.10. The four topologies are compared in
terms of iteration and time to show the performance improvement of DCE algorithm.
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Figure 3.10. Comparison between Sub-gradient algorithm and DCE Algorithm with differ-
ent topology in terms of iteration and time
According to Figure 3.10, it is clear that, the fully connected topology, topology (a)
give the best performance. While for other three topologies, topology (d) has advantages
over other two, since it improves the income for MG1, which achieve the highest cost
reduction, although it has worst cost reduction performance for MG2, MG3 and MG4.
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Based on above all the topologies, the DCE algorithm performs better than the slow
sub-gradient algorithm in terms of iteration and time. Therefore, the MGs should be
operated in distributed manner which lower the interaction time with less data exchanges.
Having achieved some more insight into the result, the search routine of
sub-gradient algorithm seems zigzag shaped. Besides, the sub-gradient algorithm is the
fastest direction for the increasing of objective function value. Therefore, it could be a
good choice to search on sub-gradient direction in the local space. However, this
algorithm’s convergence speed is slowed down in global space due to its zigzag shaped
search direction. For this drawback, the deepest cut ellipsoid algorithm with a sequence of
shrinking ellipsoids that is polynomial in time is studied in this work. During each
iteration, the sequence of each ellipsoid is more smaller in volume than its predecessor
due to its deepest cut; after that it is easy to find feasible point within this smallest global
space. So, the DCE algorithm has addressed the problem by the zigzag typed searching
direction and eventually quicken the convergence.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this section, a distributed energy trading algorithm is studied based on deep cut
ellipsoid method to minimize the global cost of the interconnected MG system. This
algorithm is not only efficient in distributed energy trading but also speeds up the system
performance quite well. The performance of DCE algorithm was validated using different
case studies for a system consisting of 4 MGs. Compared to existing work [69], the
deep-cut ellipsoid approach shows the advantageous features of modeling and
performance.
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CHAPTER 4 ENERGY OPTIMIZATION APPROACHES OF A RESIDENTIAL
COMMUNITY USING DYNAMIC PRICING
4.1 Introduction
Household electric power consumption in peak time has caused adverse effects to
the stability and reliability of the conventional electricity system. Reducing the peak
power consumption can decrease the risk of distribution and transmission network
outages. In searching for viable solutions, Demand side management strategy has been
recognized as one of the practically appealing solution to reduce the cost of electricity by
reducing the peak demand by shifting the load from peak hour to off peak hours. It is also
prevent network overloading because it provides the flexibility required to time shift the
loads. In this chapter, an optimization model is studied for a smart residential community
with the presence of smart residential appliances where the impact of priority of using
residential appliances is also taken under consideration. Contribution of this chapter
include:
• A small community energy management system is developed with three houses
considering the comfort level;
• Three types of houses with real-world appliances are implemented for a small
community according to physical characteristics;
• The three control approaches are evaluated on three case studies (fixed priority, with
priority and without priority). The fixed priority is defined that the appliances will
optimize the system according to their fixed priority order. With priority is specified
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that one appliance will work all the time and other appliances will be scheduled
based on optimization approaches. For without priority, no priority order of using
the appliances is set up for optimizing the energy consumption.
4.2 Model Description
4.2.1 Residential Load Categorization
Electricity is used in residential houses in several ways. According to the residential
energy consumption survey by USEIA (US Energy Information Administration) , 2009,
Space cooling/ heating is the main household electricity consumer. Electric water heater is
the second largest household electricity consumer. Other household appliances such as
lighting, freezers, refrigerators, cloth dryer and entertainment devices consume rest of the
electricity consumption. A typical survey of electricity consumption in residential
households in U.S.A is displayed in Figure 4.1. According to figure, space heating
accounts 41% of household electricity consumption and water heater accounts for 18%.
Other appliances electronics (e.g. cloth dryer, electric vehicles) and lighting accounts for
6%.
4.2.2 Energy Management System of a Community
The benchmark model is represented in Figure 4.2. It exhibits the hand in hand
gesture of information technology and electrical scenario in the present technological
generation. In the model, the household loads are divided into two categories, non-critical
or controllable loads and critical loads. Loads which are vital for the day to day activities
of the consumers such as cooking, refrigeration and lighting etc. fall under critical loads.
Controllable or non-critical power intensive loads can be interfered without noticeable
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Figure 4.1. A typical residential energy usages survey
effect to the consumer’s lifestyle.
Three types of houses including critical loads and controllable loads are considered
in a small community. Since these power intensive loads account for a significant
percentage of the total household demand, controlling these loads during peak hours will
help to reduce the peak demand in the community.
4.3 Constraints For Individual Appliances
Residential controllable appliances such as air conditioning unit, water heater,
clothes dryer, dishwasher and electric vehicle are modelled according to physical
characteristics. The controllable appliances have high potential in the demand response
events and to reduce cost. The manageable appliances are controlled by the central energy
management system (CEMS). The energy management system unit is responsible to
change the status of the non-critical loads in response to the demand limit specified by the
58
Energy Management System
House 1
House 2
House 3
 Air Conditioner 
 Electric Water Heater
 Cloth Dryer
 Electric Vehicle
 Critical Loads
 Air Conditioner
 Electric Water Heater
 Dish Washer
 Electric Vehicle
 Critical Loads
 Air Conditioner 
 Electric Water Heater
 Dish Washer
 Cloth Dryer
 Critical Loads
Figure 4.2. Community Based Energy Management System Model
utility.
4.3.1 Space Cooling Load Model
Space cooling unit load model is developed to adjust the power to fit preset
temperature range. In this work, to simplify the constraints, the space cooling operates
with ”on-off” status W tAC and keeps the rated power equal to PAC(kW) when turned on. For
each time step t, the demand for electricity of space cooling unit is calculated as,
PtAC = PAC×W tAC (4.1)
Also, there is a room temperature range [T minroom, T
max
room]:
T minroom ≤ T troom ≤ T maxroom. (4.2)
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The room temperature for time instance t is expressed as,
T t+∆troom = T
t
room +∆t×
Gt
∆c
+∆t×CAC
∆c
×wAC,t (4.3)
where, T troom is the room temperature, ∆t is the length(minute) ,G
t is the heat gain rate of
the house, CAC is the cooling capacity (Btu/h), ∆c is the energy needed to change the
temperature of the air in the room by 1◦F (Btu/◦F).
4.3.2 Electric Heater Load Model
The Electric Water Heater (WH) has turn on-off mode (W tWH). When it’s turned on,
it operates with rated power PWH(kW). The water temperature in the water heater has
upper and lower bound [T minoutlet , T
max
outlet], so the operation of the electric water heater should
maintain the temperature constraint:
T minoutlet ≤ T
t
outlet ≤ T
max
outlet . (4.4)
where, T toutlet is the mixed water temperature (
◦F) in the water tank at time t. For each
time step t, the demand for electricity of the water heater unit (PWH) is expressed as,
PtWH = PWH×ηWH×W tWH (4.5)
The outlet water temperature of the tank is calculated as,
(4.6)
T t+∆toutlet =
T toutlet × (Vtank − f r
t × ∆t)
Vtank
+
Tinlet × f rt × ∆t
Vtank
+
1gal
8.34lb
× [PtWH ×
3412Btu
kwh
−
Atank × (T toutlet − T
t
room)
Rtank
]× ∆t
60minhr
× 1
Vtank
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where, Vtank is the volume of the water tank (gallons), f rt is the hot water consumption
rate (gallons per minute), Tinlet is the temperature of the inlet water (◦F), PtWH is the power
of the WH (kWH), Atank is the surface area of the tank ( f t2), T troom is the room
temperature (◦F), and Rtank is the heat resistance of the tank (◦F . f t2.h/Btu).
4.3.3 Cloth Dryer Load Model
The typical cloth dryer (CD) load is task-based appliance. In the cloth dryer, the
user set up work period [T startCD , T
f inish
CD ] with the required working time T
required
CD . When the
user turns on the cloth dryer, the cloth dryer works with rated power PtCD(kW). The power
consumption of the cloth dryer is divided into two parts. Ones is as power consumption of
the motor and another one is as the power consumption of the heating coil. Therefore, the
cloth dryer should ensure the following constraints:
PtCD = k×Phc×W tCD +Pm×wtCD (4.7)
W tCD and w
t
CD = 0; (i f t < T
start
CD or t > T
f inish
CD )
T f inishCD
∑
t=T startCD
W tCD = T
required
CD (4.8)
where, Phc is the rated power of the cloth-dryer heating coil (kW), k is the drying level (k
= 1/M ,2/M,....,M/M), M is the total number of drying levels, Pm is the power consumption
of the motor (kW), W tCD is the on/off status of the cloth-dryer heating coil and w
t
CD is the
on/off status of the motor of the cloth-dryer where the status wtCD should on whenever the
customer wants to turn on the cloth-dryer; however the on/off status of the W tCD depends
on the signal from the optimization approaches.
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4.3.4 Electric Vehicle Load Model
The user of electric vehicle (EV) sets up the time range of charging period [T startEV ,
T f inishEV ] and the required charging time is T
required
EV :
T f inishEV
∑
t=T startEV
W tEV = T
required
EV (4.9)
Wt =

0, SOCt ≥ SOCmax
1, SOCt ≤ SOCmax
(4.10)
The electric vehicle charges with its rated power PEV (kW):
PtEV = PEV ×W tEV (4.11)
Battery charge state at any time slot t depends upon the charge state of the battery in the
previous time slot. Initial charge state depends on the energy used for driving. The initial
charge state is assumed as 37.5% and the battery charge state at any time slot t can be
calculated in the following equation:
(4.12)SOCt = SOCt−1 + PEV ×
∆t
Cbattery
4.3.5 Dishwasher Load Model
Dishwasher (DW) is also task-based appliance like cloth dryer and electric vehicle;
householders set up work period [T startDW , T
f inish
DW ] and required working time T
required
DW .
Once the user turns on the dishwasher, the dishwasher works with rated power PDW (kW).
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Therefore, the dishwasher should follow the constraints:
W tDW = 0 (t < T
start
DW or t > T
f inish
DW )
T f inishDW
∑
t=T startDW
W tDW = T
required
DW (4.13)
4.3.6 Critical Loads
The critical loads may include freezing, cooking and refrigeration and other
non-controllable electric appliances. The load profile is obtained from [76], where the
maximum value and minimum values are considered as 2 kW and 1 kW, respectively in
the simulation. A typical load profile variation with time for the critical loads considered
in this work is represented in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3. A load profile for critical loads during a day
4.4 Electricity Pricing Mechanism
The wholesale electricity prices differ notably from hour to hour. However the cost
to produce electricity is different for each power plant, the cost of producing one
kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity differs constantly, relying on the cost effective power
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plants [92]. In the power system operation, the power plants are operated according to an
economic dispatch i.e. in the time of low demand periods, the lowest operational cost
effective power plants will operate. At the time of high peak periods, the costly fossil fuel
based power plants have to be operated to balance demand and supply. Despite, almost all
residential users nowadays are charged some flat-rate retail price [93], [94]. Hence, the
electricity consumer use more electricity during peak hours. The domestic residential
consumers also use higher amount of electricity during late afternoon where the demand
of the electricity is high. The high peak-hour demand period induces high cost to the
electricity retailers due to the high whole sale prices. It also has a negative impact on the
reliability of the power grid [95].
In the literature, there are different electricity pricing mechanism which reflect the
actual electricity market prices, such as Time of Use (TOU) and Real Time Pricing (RTP)
. These pricing methods encourage the users to schedule the loads to off peak hours. In the
TOU pricing, the electricity price vary with the time of the day, the day of the week and
season of the year. Normally, the high electricity price is used for peak demand periods
and lower price is used for off-peak demand periods. The price which is between the
lower and higher price is used for moderate demand periods. Using the TOU pricing, the
electricity consumers know the electricity prices in the day-ahead basis, they can shift
some of their loads to off peak periods which has a less electricity price. Controllable
appliances such as water heater, air conditioners, dishwashers, cloth dryers and electric
vehicles can be shifted to off peak periods and they will be able to reduce their electricity
bill.
A typical TOU pricing mechanism [96] is considered in this work. In the considered
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TOU pricing mechanism, the whole day is divided into three time periods and three
different energy prices are used for these three time periods. The energy prices during
each time periods are represented in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4. Variation of electricity prices using Time of Use pricing mechanism
Table 4.1. Time of Use energy prices [97]
Period Time interval Energy Price (cents per kWh)
On-peak period 2 p.m. - 7 p.m. 20.3217
Off-peak period 7 a.m. - 2 p.m. and 7 p.m.- 11 p.m. 6.1132
Super off-peak period 11 p.m.-7 a.m. 1.3063
4.5 Objective Function
In this paper, the energy management system (EMS) of the community is
formulated as a power system optimization problem. All the controllable appliances are
participated into the optimization where the power consumption of the house for a certain
period of time is limited by the utility. For any time instance t, the total power
consumption of a house at time t can be expressed as,
Pnt = [A1nt ,A2nt , ...,Aint ][x1nt ,x2nt , ...,xint ]T (4.14)
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where, A, x, n and i represent the rated power consumption of the appliances, the status,
the number of houses and the number of appliances, respectively. For an example, the
power consumption of house 1 can be written as,
(4.15)P
1t = [PAC,PWH ,PCD,PEV ,PCri]
[W 1tAC,W
1t
WH ,W
1t
CD,W
1t
EV ,W
1t
Cri]
T
where, the rated power of the each appliances are multiplied with the status of the
appliances at time t. The value of the status W ti can be 0 (off) or 1 (on) which is depended
on the optimization signal. In the optimization method, the power consumption is
constrained by the inequality and equality constraints where the inequality constraint is
used to keep the power consumption in a certain demand limit as,
N=3
∑
n=1
Pnt ≤ Dt (4.16)
And the equality constraint is used to set-up priority of the controllable appliances based
on customer’s priority. For an example, if the customer of house 1 wants to give priority to
the air conditioner to keep the room temperature in a certain range, then the equality
constraint can be expressed as,
[PAC,0,0,0,0][W 1tAC,0,0,0,0]
T = P1tAC (4.17)
In this paper, the objective is to maximize the power consumption considering the
specified demand limit to keep the customer comfort level as good as possible as,
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Pt = max
W t
N=3
∑
n=1
Pnt (4.18)
V =
T=1440
∑
t=1
PtCt (4.19)
where, Pt is the total power consumption of all the appliances at time t, W t is the on-off
status (0 = Off / 1 = On) set of the appliances at time t and Ct is the power consumption
cost in $/kWh at time t. The proposed optimization techniques can be solved with the
equation (4.18) through binary decision variables W it as there is a need for 5×1440
binary variables for each houses to describe the scheduling of the five appliances by taking
the time resolution as minute.
4.6 Proposed Approaches
4.6.1 Genetic Algorithm
Solving the optimization problems optimally, genetic algorithm is a technique
inspired by the principle of evolution. Genetic algorithm uses a ”Chromosomal”
representation that requires the optimal solution to be coded as a finite length string. In
this work, the genetic algorithm optimization technique can be formulated using the
fitness function FTt as it is marked as the objective function to maximize the power
consumption (Pnt) ignoring the discomfort of the user as,
FTt = max
W t
N=3
∑
n=1
(Pnt) (4.20)
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where, W t is the status set. Five decision variables are introduced since there are five loads
(four are controllable and one is critical). Inequality constraint is determined to ensure the
maximum use of power of the five appliances of each houses. Equality constraint is
specified the priority of the loads. Genetic algorithm toolbox [98] is used in MATLAB
environment to get the maximum optimal power consumption of each house in a small
community to shift the loads from peak hour off-peak hour to ensure the minimization of
energy cost of each houses in a community.
4.6.2 Dynamic Programming
The DP is a widely-used mathematical technique for solving optimization problems
that can be divided into sub-problems and where decisions are required in each stage [99].
In this paper, the optimization problem is formulated as a discrete decision problem using
the traditional DP where the goal is to find a set of status (W nt) for each houses so that the
objective function can be maximized (DPmax) or minimized (DPmin) based on the
customer’s choice as,
W nt = argmax/min(Pnt) (4.21)
Since, the status W ti is 0 (off) or 1 (on) for each appliances, the possible combination of
five-dimensional decision vectors are found as 25 = 32 for each time instances and for
each houses. Then, the system is trained by the equality and inequality constraints. After
training the constraints, the system selects ’k’ number of decision vectors that obeys the
constraints. For the DPmax, the system selects a decision vector that maximizes the power
consumption which is suitable for customer’s comfortability and in terms of the DPmin, the
system selects a decision vector that minimizes the power consumption which is suitable
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for minimizing the electricity bills.
The proposed optimization algorithm flowchart is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
According to control strategy, at each time, the system sends the household load profiles
and user priorities to the energy management system. When the total power consumption
of the community exceeds the generation (Dt) by utility grid, then it will go to the
optimization stage of each houses and assign the demand limit (Dt) to the residents
equally. According to the assignment of demand limit (Dt), the appliances are turned off
based on their preferences and scheduled the appliances of each house to off-peak period.
Then, the system calculates the total power consumption for each resident, and sends the
information to the utility. Afterwards, the system check the next time period and if it is
less than T, then the system follows the same procedure again.
4.7 Simulation and Results
In this section, the operations of controllable loads without and with demand limits
for Time of use (TOU) pricing schemes are taken into consideration. First, the operation
of power intensive non-critical loads are explored with and without energy management
system. Second, three case studies are investigated to validate a demand response
algorithm adopted from [76] and three optimization approaches (GA, DPmax, DPmin) for
the three houses in a community. The numerical results are shown to evaluate the
performance of the optimization techniques. The power need of the community is met by
power from the grid. Twenty four (24) hours time horizon is assumed, starting from 6 AM
to next day 6 AM. The power intensive controllable load models are modeled in
MATLAB environment. All codes were run on an Intel Core i-7 2.7-GHz computer. All
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Figure 4.5. Proposed optimization algorithm for optimizing residential load demands.
the essential parameters of each house appliances are adopted from [100].
To validate the performance of genetic algorithm and dynamic programming, three
cases are investigated under same environment. In the optimization period, the cloth dryer
and dishwasher have started at 6 P.M. as specified by the user but due to demand limit, the
operation of motor coil has started. The heating coil has started when the household
power consumption is less than the demand limit. The Critical loads are the
noncontrollable loads does not participate in the optimization event.
The Electric Vehicle (EV) should take 4 hours 10 minutes between 5:00 P.M. to
9:10 P.M. to fully charge the electric with 37.5% initial state of charge, the CD operates
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Table 4.2. The Parameters of the appliances
Parameters Values Units Parameters Values Units
∆t 160 minute Pm 0.3 kW
CAC -33000 Btu/h Phc 3.7 kW
∆c 0.0195 Btu/0F PDWhc 2.7 kW
T minroom 64.4
0F T startCD 6 pm
T maxroom 71.6
0F T requiredCD 90 minutes
T minoutlet 107.6
0F T startDW 6 pm
T maxoutlet 118.4
0F T requiredDW 30 minutes
Tset 68 0F T
required
DW 20 minutes
PAC 2.352 kW T startDW 6 pm
Vtank 80 gallons PEV 3.6 kW
Tinlet 68 0F Cbattery 24 kWh
PWH 4 kW SOCmax 100 %
Atank 14 f t2 SOC0 37.5 %
Rtank 16 0F. f t2.
h/Btu
for 1.5 hours between 7:00 P.M. to 8:30 P.M. and the dishwasher (DW) works 30 minutes
(for house 2) and 20 minutes (for house 3).
The operation results between 6 AM to next day 6 AM of the three cases are shown
in Figure [4.14, 4.15, 4.16]. The purpose of the three cases is to evaluate the performance
of the proposed approaches (genetic algorithm, dynamic programming) for three houses in
a community. The cost savings are also analyzed and compared among these three
approaches of the three houses.
4.7.1 Operation of power intensive controllable loads with and without EMS
4.7.1.1 Electric water heater
The operation of the electric water heater with and without EMS is described in this
section. In this model, if the water temperature falls below the lower limit of the expected
temperature value, then heating coils of water heater are turned on. If the water
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temperature increases above the upper limit of expected temperature, then the water heater
are switched off. If the temperature of the water maintains preset comfort range, the status
of the water heater will keep as previous. To illustrate the model according to this work,
the hot water draw event occur at around 7 A.M., 8 P.M., around 9 P.M. and around 11
P.M.- see the water temperature drops. Due to large water draw event occur at 8 P.M.,
around 9 P.M. and around 11 P.M. makes the outlet water temperature drops dramatically
below the lower limit of desired water temperature in the tank. After finishing the large
water draw event, the water heater controller operates to bring the water temperature
within the preset comport range (107.6-118.4 ◦F).
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Figure 4.6. Operation of electric water heater unit without EMS
During the EMS control operation at peak period, the electric heater should operate
first as the priority is high. For the period of 8-11 p.m., the water heater is operated along
with the critical load consumption. However, the EMS controller deferred the other
appliances according to their priority.
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Figure 4.7. Operation of electric water heater unit with EMS
4.7.1.2 Air conditioning unit
The model of AC is presented in Section 4.3.1. For the AC unit, the preset comfort
range is set between 66 ◦F to 70 ◦F . From the Figure 4.8, it can be seen that if the room
temperature is above the desired upper temperature limit of the comfort zone, the AC unit
is turned on. As soon as, the temperature of the room drops down below the desired lower
temperature limit, the space cooling unit is switched off. The AC unit’s ON and OFF
cycles repeated throughout the day to maintain room temperature within preset
comfortable range.
At the peak demand period, the demand limit is fixed at 4 kW. Due to the 4 kW
demand limit from 6-7 P.M., the room temperature rise up to 91.8 ◦F and violets the
comfort range. The EMS controller tries to maintain the requested demand limit by
prolonging loads according to their priority (EWH >AC > CD > EV). The EMS
controller shut down the space cooling unit during the period (6-7 P.M.) by maintaining
the total household load consumption within requested demand limit.
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Figure 4.8. Operation of air conditioning unit without EMS
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Figure 4.9. Operation air conditioning unit with EMS
4.7.1.3 Cloth dryer and dishwasher
The cloth dryer and dishwasher are the task based appliances that described in
Section 4.3.3 and 4.3.5. These task based appliances models consists of two power
consumption parts, motor and heating coils. The appliances (e.g. cloth dryer) should
operated at specified time (90 minutes). Due to the demand limit at peak period, the motor
of cloth dryer are started. However, the EMS controller can control the heating coils of
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cloth dryer by considering load priorities and demand limit.
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Figure 4.10. Operation of cloth dryer without EMS
The Figure 4.11 presented operation period during EMS control. The EMS
controller turn on the heating coils at 7 P.M. for a short time as the total household load
consumption is less than the demand limit at that time. Then, for next few minutes heating
coils of cloth dryer are paused allowing the electric water heater to operate. The cloth
dryer should operated in next two hours, when the water heater is not in operation and
complete work at 9 P.M.
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Figure 4.11. Operation of cloth dryer with EMS
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4.7.1.4 Electric vehicle
The operation of electric vehicle model is described in Section 4.3.4. Without EMS,
the electric vehicle started the charging at 5 P.M. and finished at 9:10 P.M. (Figure 4.12).
Due to the restricted demand limit in the peak period and the preferences of the
appliances, the EMS controller deferred the EV’s charging period at 9 P.M. In Figure 4.13,
it is noticed that the EV started charging after the cloth dryer operation time. Then for few
minutes, the charging of electric vehicle is paused as the high priority water heater are
turned on. After finishing the water heater job, the charging of EV again started and
completed it’s charging at 1:30 A.M.
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Figure 4.12. Operation of electric vehicle with EMS
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Figure 4.13. Operation of electric vehicle with EMS
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4.7.2 Case Study 1: Fixed Priority
Considering case study 1, the total power consumption of the house 1 for
unscheduled scenario is 5194.3 kW bought from grid owing to the additional power
demand from cloth dryer, dishwasher and electric vehicle. When the optimization
approaches and DR-Algorithm are in process, the power taken from grid does not exceed
the demand limit. The power consumption for DR-algorithm, GA, DPmax and DPmin are
given the identical values (5217.7 kW) since the priority of all appliances are fixed. The
personal priorities of the resident are summarized in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3. Controllable load priorities
Controllable Loads Priority
Water heater 4
Air conditioning unit 3
Cloth dryer 2
Electric vehicle 1
The results are summarized in Table 4.4. In this case, inequality constraints are not
considered where the house 1 power consumption of P1t at time t is specified by utility
demand limit Dt . Equality constraints set up the priority of the appliances based on the
consumer preferences to ensure that all the appliances are turned on at time t. In the
optimization period, if the required power consumption of the house is greater than
demand limit Dt , the certain appliances need to be turned off based on the optimization
signal according to the priority order.
Figure 4.14 shows that while minimizing the cost of energy, the scheduling of
appliances have moved in the time range where time of use tariff is low.
All the methods are given the same electricity consumption minimization results in
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Figure 4.14. Household energy consumption for House 1 since the fixed priority is taken.
Table 4.4. Case A: Fixed priority for House 1
Appliances
Power Consumption (kW)
Unscheduled DR DP˙max DP˙min GA
Air 1768.7 1768.7 1768.7 1768.7 1768.7
conditioner
Water 328 328 328 328 328
heater
Cloth 360 383.4 383.4 383.4 383.4
dryer
Electric 903.6 903.6 903.6 903.6 903.6
vehicle
Critical 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834
loads
Total 5194.3 5217.7 5217.7 5217.7 5217.7
Cost ($) 8.0482 6.0764 6.0764 6.0764 6.0764
Time (s) 0 10 5 5.5 298
this case. As for computational time DPmax and DPmin are the fastest, and only takes 5s
and 5.5s respectively. Required computational time for GA is ∼ 60 × of DPmax and 55 ×
of DPmin. The cost of electricity for unscheduled case is $8.0482. When minimizing the
energy cost, the cost of energy is $6.0764 showing the energy savings of 24.5% in all the
approaches.
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4.7.3 Case Study 2: With Priority
As for case study 2, the power consumption and the energy cost are shown in Table
4.5 for genetic algorithm, DPmax and DPmin. In this case, the water heater is fixed as
priority and other appliances set up their priority based on the optimization signal. The
inequality constraints are considered to make the total power consumption Pt of the
community within demand limit Dt . The equality constraint only sets up the priority of the
water heater as constant at time t. The cloth dryer (house 1 and 3) and dishwasher (house
2 and house 3) work similarly as before. In this event, the cost reduction for three
approaches are 18% ,17.82% and 33.45% than unscheduled case.
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Figure 4.15. Total Household energy consumption for a small community since the priority
is considered.
Figure 4.15 shows the power of the residential community in different approaches.
In the peak period (2 p.m.-7 p.m.), the users of the community use less energy since the
electricity price is high. During the off peak period (7 p.m.-11 p.m.) and the super off
peak period (12 a.m.-6 a.m.), the electricity price is relatively low and the consumers
should use more energy, contributing to bill reduction.
According to the Table 4.5, the DPmin reduces the significant amount of cost since it
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Table 4.5. Case B: With priority for a community
Houses
Power Consumption (kW)
Unscheduled GA DP˙max DP˙min
House1 5194.3 5284.3 5217.7 4903.3
House2 4909.3 4927.3 4888.1 4618.3
House3 4350.7 4398.1 4355.3 4217.9
Total 14454.3 14609.7 14535.9 13739.5
Cost($) 21.8061 17.85 17.92 14.51
curtails the loads in the peak hour as customer comfort level is violated. The other two
approaches shift the loads from peak hour to off-peak hour by consuming the power as
much as possible by maintaining the demand limit Dt .
4.7.4 Case Study 3: Without Priority
Results for case study 3 are shown in Table 4.6. In this case, there are no priority of
the appliances as there are no equality constraints have been set up. The inequality
constraints work similarly as case study 2. The total cost savings for three approaches are
18.64%, 20.34% and 36.16%, respectively in the community.
Time (minutes)
6 AM 7 AM 8 AM 9 AM 10 AM 11 AM 12 PM 1 PM 2 PM 3 PM 4 PM 5 PM 6 PM 7 PM 8 PM 9 PM 10 PM 11 PM 12 AM 1 AM 2 AM 3 AM 4 AM 5 AM 6 AM
P
ow
er
(k
W
)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Demand Limit Unscheduled GA DP Max DP Min
Figure 4.16. Total Household energy consumption for a small community since no priority
is taken.
In this case, there are little higher cost savings in all the approaches in the residential
community than in case studies 1 and 2.
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Table 4.6. Case C: Without priority for a community
Houses
Power Consumption (kW)
Unscheduled GA DP˙max DP˙min
House1 5194.3 5136.3 5200.3 4755.3
House2 4909.3 4779.3 4888.1 4470.3
House3 4350.7 4380.7 4169.4 4069.99
Total 14454.3 14296 14257.8 13295.59
Cost($) 21.8061 17.74 17.37 13.92
4.8 Concluding Remarks
In this section, a small residential community energy management system is
proposed to schedule load from peak period to off-peak period without affecting
consumers’ life style. A residential community of three houses are considered with
different electric appliances. Two heuristic approaches named Genetic algorithm (GA)
and dynamic programming (DP) based smart appliance scheduling schemes and
time-of-use pricing are proposed for comparative studies with demand response. Three
case studies are demonstrated that all three control approaches can optimize energy
consumption according to demand limit. The DPmin generally showed the smallest energy
cost since it curtails the loads in the peak hour. Genetic algorithm can optimize the energy
consumption hence reduce the cost but require higher computational time. The DPmax
reduces the computational complexity as well as decreases the energy cost. The DPmax is
suggested to be the best choice for real life application, due to good performance in cost
optimization.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, the research reported an overview of the contributions of this thesis
towards the aim of energy management of residential communities and interconnected
micro-grids. The objective of the thesis is to investigate demand side management in
residential communities, deregulated electricity market and energy trading among
interconnected microgrids. We have considered the several challenging issues for
improving the existing power system and provided intelligent solutions by using smart
grid technologies and integrating and employing household appliances,
plug-in-electric-vehicles (PEV), energy storage and distributed energy systems.
Throughout the thesis, a couple of optimization schemes were developed to accomplish
the objectives the smart grid. In each proposed approach, the numerical analysis was
performed to show the effectiveness of the proposed model. Various simulation programs
have been developed and displayed the results to evaluate the performance of proposed
mechanisms.
5.1 Summary of the Thesis
This thesis was presented in four chapters. Chapter 1 presented a brief introduction
to smart grid, demand side management, electricity market and transactive energy among
microgrids. In this chapter, the literatures of energy management schemes and electricity
markets are also analyzed. The motivation of the work was discussed while citing the
main objectives of the thesis. We summarized the problem based on the limitation existing
works.
Chapter 2 presented a new game-theoretic scheme to study the optimization and
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decision making of multi-players in the distributed power system. The proposed game
theoretic special concept-rational reaction set (RRS) is capable to model the game of the
distributed energy providers and the large residential consumers. This scheme helps the
residential consumers to participate in the retail electricity market by controlling the
market price. The proposed approach also enables the distributed operators and residential
consumers to efficiently integrate a wide range of renewable energy resources. The
consumption agents are not only able to find market clearing price at Nash equilibrium
point but also reduce the electricity cost individually (non-cooperatively). The proposed
game theoretic approach were evaluated through simulation in MATLAB by various case
studies. The simulation results have shown that the proposed approach can be effectively
used as a tool for investigating the retail electricity market.
Chapter 3 presented a distributed energy trading approach based on deep-cut
ellipsoid method under a distribution network. The problem is formulated as energy
management problem to minimize the total system cost. An hour-ahead optimization
model is constructed and the objective function includes the operation of DGS and
network tariff. A distributed iterative algorithm is studied based on deep cut ellipsoid
method considering descent search direction. The convergence of DCE algorithm was
proved and verified with numerical results. Moreover, the results have been shown that
each MG can adjust generation of DGs or trade with other MGs with a extensive
consideration of generation cost and trading price and load characteristics. The distributed
energy trading based on DCE algorithm has also been applied to four topologies and
found that certain topologies were more beneficial than others. Compared with the
existing work [69], the DCE algorithm has been shown the advantageous features on
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modeling and performance.
Chapter 4 presented the optimization schemes for the residential community with
multiple houses based on smart appliances scheduling- genetic algorithm (GA) and
dynamic programming (DP) . In the proposed schemes, the time of use (TOU) pricing
mechanism is used to identify the electricity cost. The optimization control approaches are
capable of solving load scheduling problem of a small community. Three different house
with real-world non critical appliances, with different power consumption are compared
under energy management benchmark problem. Three case studies are demonstrated that
all three control approaches can optimize energy consumption according to demand limit.
The DPmin generally showed the smallest energy cost since it curtails the loads in the peak
hour. On the other hand, genetic algorithm and aggressive dynamic programming (DPmax)
are capable to reduce energy cost but differs the computational complexity. Genetic
algorithm takes higher computational time than DPmax to solve this problem. The
simulation results have shown that the aggressive dynamic programming (DPmax) is
suggested to be the best choice for real life application, due to good performance in cost
optimization.
5.2 Original Contribution of the Work
In this thesis, community energy management approaches and strategic electricity
market architecture were proposed for smart grid retarded by various challenges. The
proposed strategies were designed to cope with main issues- price control facilities at
customer end and load scheduling schemes of distributed operator. We have listed the
following major contributions of this thesis.
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5.2.1 Distributed Game Theoretic Scheme of Electricity Market
We proposed a game theoretic framework to study the optimization and decision
making of multilayer in the distributed power system. We apply the game theoretic special
concept- rational reaction set (RRS), which is capable to model the game of distributed
energy provider and the large residential consumers. In this scheme, the consumption
agents are not only able to find market price at Nash equilibrium but also reduce the
electricity cost non-cooperatively.
5.2.2 Distributed Energy Trading Approach for Interconnected Micro-grids
We studied a distributed energy trading framework to minimize the global cost of
the interconnected MG system. The convex optimization technique called deep cut
ellipsoid method, which is capable to model the distributed energy trading approach for
islanded MGs. The DCE algorithm was validated using different case studies for a system
consisting of 4 MGs. The performance of DCE algorithm is compared with sub-gradient
approach, which provides the faster performance in DCE approach.
5.2.3 Intelligent Energy Management Approaches of Residential Community
We proposed a optimization model for a residential community with real world
appliances. The two computational intelligence schemes- genetic algorithm and dynamic
programming are used to solve the optimization problem. Using those schemes, each
consumer can achieve the highest reduced electricity cost and good performance for
energy scheduling.
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5.3 Future Scope of the Work
• Future extension of the problem, includes understanding the incentive based energy
trading mechanism can be applied between small energy providers and buyers to
encourage proactive energy trading and fair benefit sharing. Another interesting
direction of game theoretic trading approach to find the computationally efficient
solution of large-scale distributed power systems.
• Future extension of of the energy trading problem, includes considering the
indeterminacy of renewable energy generation, demand response and load demand,
for which current deterministic approach would be no longer applicable.
• Future extension of the proposed work, includes understanding how the energy
scheduling can be improved by introducing distributed renewable resources at the
customer-end and the distributed system operator can be offered fair reimbursement
to the customers by participating efficient demand response program, thereby
improving the system efficiency and reliability.
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